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Abstract
In this paper, we assess the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic
trade policies. In particular, how the trade policy and the bargaining process over managerial
contract are strategically connected within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation
model is analyzed. We explore the policy impacts in two different models: the export rivalry
model and the import-competing model, and show that the introduction of managers'
bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export subsidy and optimal tariff in different
models.
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1.  Introduction 
Strategic managerial delegation research started with Vickers (1985), Fershtman and 
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (henceforth VFJS). It is meaningful to understand 
how trade policy will be affected by intra-firm incentive schemes, and in particular, to 
see how optimal trade policy may be designed in light of changes in managerial 
incentive contracts. Das (1997) and Colonques (1997) extended Brander and Spencer 
(1984, 1985) by adopting sales delegation specification, to study strategic trade policy 
in the context of delegated firms. They concluded that strategic trade policy under 
delegation results in lower levels of the trade policy instruments. Bandyopadhyay and 
Bandyopadhyay (2001) presented an efficient bargaining model and analyzed the 
welfare effects of unionization, where rival exporting governments employ strategic 
export policy. 
Strategic delegation analysis was hitherto limited to sales delegation cases, until 
Jansen et al. (2007) and Ritz (2008) presented the case of market share delegation. 
They pointed out that the manager’s objectives not only focus on sales revenue, but on 
product market share rate as well. Wang et al., (2008) assess the influence upon 
optimal trade policy of introducing market share delegation in a trade duopoly context. 
It shows that delegation matters, and different forms of delegation coupled with 
asymmetric costs will imply different degrees of government intervention. 
Along with the market expansion of global capitalism, the problem with 
globalization is that the state intends to “capture” the overseas market by using 
production subsidies as instruments to support exporting firms in shifting foreign 
profit, as well as to “protect” the domestic market by imposing tariffs against foreign 
exporters. It is well-known that the rationale for such “monopoly power” of the state 
on strategic trade policy is owed to profit-shifting motives. In the name of corporate 
capitalism, power separation prevails between the owner and manager in large 
corporations, where different delegation contracts with or without bargaining are 
being implemented and analyzed. The incentive of delegation to managers by the 
owners is a profit-shifting mechanism, which will reduce the scale of intervention by 
the government. The new element here is the bargaining scheme, and due to that, the 
authorities give some power to managers, and they may play a role as partners under a 
tendency towards trade liberalization. In such global corporate capitalist models, 
shouldn’t less government intervention be expected? 
In this paper, we look at the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on 
strategic trade policies. In particular, it analyzes how the trade policy and the 
bargaining process over managerial contract are strategically connected within the 
context of bargaining over the sales delegation model á la Van Witteloostuijn et al., 
(2007) which integrates bargaining process and the managerial contracts in delegation 
game
1. The timing of our model is that the government adopts trade policy in the first 
stage. In the second stage, the owners negotiate with their managers about executive 
remuneration in the sales delegation game. Finally, in the third stage, the managers 
decide on the output level of their firms.   
We first explore the export rivalry model where a homogeneous good is produced 
                                                        
1 Van Witteloostuijn et al., (2007) examined in the sales delegation case how profits and social 
welfare depend on managerial power, which has been extended by Nakamura (2008), Kamaga and 
Nakamura (2008) for examining the implications of sequential move and product differentiation 
respectively. 
  1by two different firms, each located in a different country, and exporting to a third 
country. Subsequently, in an import-competing model, both home and foreign firms 
sell homogeneous goods in the home country. The home government imposes a 
specific tariff on the foreign firm to support the development of its industry. Given 
that the issue about the relationship between optimal-welfare tariff and 
maximum-revenue tariff has attracted scholarly attention, we study two cases: the 
home government may seek to maximize either national welfare, or tariff revenue. We 
compare our results with the Das (1997) model without bargaining process, and show 
that the introduction of managers' bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export 
subsidy and optimal tariff in different models. In the export rivalry model, we 
demonstrate that the optimal subsidy difference is scaled-down by the bargaining 
power on the marginal cost difference. In an import-competing model, we derive the 
finding that the manager’s bargaining power is negatively associated with the specific 
tariff. Furthermore, we rank the optimal tariffs under managerial delegation with and 
without bargaining stage, and simple Cournot game. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the export 
rivalry model and presents the equilibrium values. Section 3 examines the 
import-competing model in the tariff revenue maximization case and national welfare 
cases. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The Export Rivalry Model 
We analyze the market for homogeneous goods that are produced by two different 
firms, each located in a different country, indexed 1 and 2 respectively. The marginal 
production cost of firm i is constant at  1 i c < ,  1, 2 i = . Both firms sell products in a 
third country’s market, and the inverse demand is given by p=1-Q, where   
is the total output of the two firms. Country 1 and 2’s governments provide specific 
export subsidies,  ,  , to their producers. Assume that the owners of both 
firms hire a manager and delegate the output decision to that manager. Each manager 
receives a fixed salary and a bonus which is based on a weighted sum of profits and 
sales revenue (sales delegation), 
12 Qqq =+
i s 1, 2 i =
i i i i q w u + =π , where  i i i i i q s q c p + − = ) ( π   denotes 
the profits of the  th firm and the weight   is a non-negative number. The 
bargaining process is modeled by means of the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution: , and 
i i w
β β β βπ
− − − = =
1 2 2 1 ) ( i i i i i i i q w q q u B [0,1) β ∈ is a measure for the relative 
bargaining power of the manager.   
We propose a three-stage game with the following timing. In the first stage, the 
exporting countries decide on the optimal subsidy to maximize its 
welfare: ii i SW s qi π =− . The second stage is the bargaining process. Then, in the last 
stage, the managers simultaneously and independently choose their outputs. We 
assume that how the firms choose output levels follows the policy decisions that are 
committed by their respective governments. We solve the game by applying backward 
induction from the last stage of the game to obtain a Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (SPNE).   
Stage 3: Managers choose the output to maximize their remuneration: 
[(1 ) ] iii i i i i uw qc s Q w i q π =+ =− +− + .  (1)
Maximizing Equation (1), we get 
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From the above equations, we can easily deduce the following results:   
2
ii uq =  
2
iii ii i uw qq w q π =− = − i  for  1, 2 i = . 
Stage 2: The bargaining stage, 
β β β βπ
− − − = =
1 2 2 1 ) ( i i i i i i i q w q q u B .  (3)
According to the following first-order conditions,   
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Stage1:  T h e   p o l i c y   s t a g e ,                  
(1 ) ii i i i SW s q c Q qi π =− = − − （） .  (4)
The specific subsidy   provided for the firms will decrease their marginal cost. 
We then redefine  , 
i s
' ii cc s =− i 1, 2 i = , and use the results deduced from the 
first-order conditions of the above stages to obtain the following equilibrium 
outcomes:  
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The superscript B denotes competition in incentive with bargaining process and the 
subscript C denotes Cournot competition among the managers.   
De Meza (1986) pointed out that the lower a firm’s marginal cost, the higher 
subsidy its country will offer, which implies that the low-cost firm will have an even 
larger market share after subsidization. It is meaningful to examine the relationship 
between the difference in optimal subsidies and that in marginal costs. 














As noted in Mai and Hwang (1988, p.281), “provided the demand curve is linear, 
the optimal subsidy difference is equal to the marginal cost difference”. Introducing 
the bargaining power in our model reduces the scale of optimal subsidy difference, but 
  3the power reinforces the owner’s incentive difference and accordingly enlarges the 
output difference.
2
The optimal subsidy with sales delegation in Das (1997), denoted by superscript  I , 
is  (1 14)(1 4 3 )
I
iC i j sc =− + c  and that in a simple Cournot game without delegation is 
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In the absence of bargaining process,  0 β = , we have the results as shown in Das 
(1997). When the bargaining power approaches one, it appears from (5) that the 






Proposition 1: The optimal export subsidy with the bargaining process is less than the 
result without bargaining process, and the export subsidy in the simple Cournot 
equilibrium is the highest. 
3. The Import-Competing Model 
The import tariff rate may be determined through revenue maximization rather than 
the national welfare maximization, which reflects the operation of an inefficient tax 
system in many developing countries.   
Johnson (1951-1952) demonstrated that the maximum-revenue tariff exceeds the 
optimum-welfare tariff. Brander and Spencer (1984) have shown that a tariff has a 
profit-shift effect besides its effect on consumer surplus and tariff revenue. Collie 
(1991), and Clarke and Collie (2006) further demonstrated that optimum-welfare tariff 
may exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under both Cournot and Bertrand duopoly.   
In the import-competing model, both home (indexed  ) and foreign (indexed  h f ) 
firms sell homogeneous products in the home country. The inverse demand function 
of the home country is  . Each firm produces the good at constant marginal 
cost  ; subscripts 
1 p =− Q
1 , fh cc < f  and    denote the foreign and home firm respectively. 
In order to support the home country's industries, government tends to protect 
domestic industries through adopting a variety of trade policies, such as import quotas, 
export subsidies, specific tariffs, etc. We assume that the government imposes a 
specific tariff on the foreign firm, so the foreign firm will have to endure an increase 
in marginal cost,  . The other stages are the same as in the export rivalry model. 
h
f c +t
                                                       
The home country may seek to maximize social welfare or tariff revenue. We will 
study the two cases respectively, and the import tariff ranking under Cournot duopoly 
with different form of delegation vis-à-vis no delegation. 
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3 We have to exclude the extreme case in order to avoid an irrational denominator in equilibrium 
and keep the delegating capability of the owner. 
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3.1 Social Welfare Maximization 
The objective of the home country is to choose an optimal tariff   to maximize its 
social welfare: 
t




hh f Qa Q c q t q =+ − − + .  (7)
We obtain the following equilibrium outcomes:   
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The last superscript W  denotes the outcome when the home country seeks to 
maximize its social welfare. 
The results from Equation (8) show that the manager’s bargaining power is 
negatively associated with the specific tariff; the amelioration of the manager’s 
bargaining power urges the home country to reduce the welfare-maximizing tariff. 






In Das (1997), the optimal tariff is  (1 4) 1
I
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In the absence of bargaining process,  0 β = , we have the results as shown in Das 
(1997). 
Proposition 2: When a bargaining process over managerial delegation is allowed, the 
welfare-maximizing tariff is less than the case without bargaining, but it is the highest 
one in the simple Cournot game. 
3.2 Tariff Revenue Maximization   
Rather than maximizing social welfare, the home firm may determine the import tariff 
rate through tariff revenue maximization. The objective function is  f R tq = , where 
f q   denotes the foreign firm’s output level.   
We obtain the following outcomes:   
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The last superscript R  denotes the outcome when the home country seeks to 
maximize its tariff revenue. When the bargaining power approaches one, it appears 
from (10) that the tariff goes to zero only when  hf cc = . 
The results from Equation (10) show that the tariff pursued by the home country 
decreases if the bargaining power of the managers is improved. Similarly, the optimal 
tariffs under tariff revenue maximization without bargaining stage and simple Cournot 
games are  (1 6)(1 ) (1 2)( )
I
Ch h tc c =− + − f c  and  (1 4)(1 ) (1 2)( ) Ch h tc c f c = −+ −  , 
and in a market share delegation game  (1 14) 2 (1 ) (1 2)( )
M
Ch tc =− + （4- ） h f c c − , the 
superscript  M   denotes market share delegation game.
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Proposition 3: With a bargaining process in a sales delegation game, the tariff 
revenue-maximizing government will impose a least tariff on the foreign firm, while 
in a simple Cournot competition it has a greatest value. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examined the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on 
strategic trade policy in different models. In the export rivalry model, it showed that 
the optimal export subsidy with the bargaining process is less than the result without 
bargaining process, and the export subsidy in the simple Cournot equilibrium is the 
highest. In an import-competing model, we derived the tariff rate through two 
methods: social welfare maximization and tariff revenue maximization, and showed 
that the introduction of managers' bargaining process always leads to a decrease in the 
optimal tariff rate, whether the government is maximizing social welfare or tariff 
                                                        
4 See Wang et al., (2008) for tariff rankings under social welfare or/and tariff revenue 
maximization. 
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revenue. 
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